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REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAWS-EFFECT UPON 
A SUBSEQUENT ANTITRUST SuIT OF FCC APPROVAL oF AN Ex-
CHANGE OF TELEVISION STATIONS-United States v. Radio Cor-
poration of America-Creation of independent regulatory agen-
cies presented the courts with the problem of allocating jurisdic-
tion whenever the determination of proper judicial action was 
found to require the resolution of issues which an administrative 
agency was competent to resolve. To meet this problem the doc-
trine of "primary jurisdiction" was developed whereby admin-
istrative issues are to be decided by the agency prior to the court's 
determination of issues not within the realm of the agency. Appli-
cation of the doctrine is based on the need for efficient and uni-
form agency regulation and the desirability of utilizing agency 
expertise in regard to issues beyond the conventional experience 
of judges. Such application is guided by a determination of often-
elusive legislative intent. Where appropriate, agency determina-
tions will be conclusive in subsequent judicial proceedings as to 
matters within the scope of the agency's power regardless of 
whether the issue was brought to the agency initially1 or whether 
it was referred to the agency under the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine.2 It is not surprising that "50 years of constant litigation have 
failed to formulate the doctrine in a manner which enables 
litigants to choose the proper forum with a reasonable degree 
of certainty."3 
The problems in regard to the applicability of primary juris-
diction in antitrust suits involve the additional requirement of 
harmonizing the antitrust laws with a regulatory statute which in 
large measure is meant to provide a substitute for competition. 
This harmonizing may range from complete applicability of the 
antitrust laws to supercession of the antitrust remedies by remedies 
provided under the regulatory statute, or to a complete antitrust 
exemption. In the recent case of United States v. Radio Corpora-
tion of America,4 the United States Supreme Court held that a de-
1 D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, Inc., (2d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 947; Black River 
Valley Broadcasts, Inc. v. McNich, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 235. See comment, 58 
CoL. L. REv. 673 at 698 (1958). 
2 United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 1008. 
3 Comment, 25 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 192 (1957). 
4 79 S. Ct. 457 (1959). The decision was unanimous, with Justices Frankfurter and 
Douglas taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
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termination by the Federal Communications Commission that 
there was no antitrust violation connected with a requested license 
transfer would not be conclusive in a subsequent antitrust suit 
against one of the parties to the transfer since the FCC has no 
power to determine antitrust issues as such. The Court also held 
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not operate to exempt 
the transfer from the applicability of the antitrust laws. 
I 
On May 16, 1955, National Broadcasting Co. (a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America) and Westing-
house Broadcasting Co. entered into a written agreement under 
which Westinghouse would acquire the television and radio broad-
casting facilities of NBC in Cleveland plus $3,000,000 and NBC 
would acquire the television and radio broadcasting facilities of 
Westinghouse in Philadelphia. Applications for FCC approval of 
the exchange were filed on June 15, 1955. The FCC notified the 
Justice Department on August 12, 1955 of the applications and 
that possible antitrust questions were raised by the applications.5 
The FCC issued letters on October 17, 1955 pursuant to section 
309(b) of the Communications Act6 requesting additional informa-
tion on various issues including the antitrust questions, and re-
ceived answers furnishing detailed data. The FCC also conducted 
an extensive investigation and analysis of its own in regard to the 
proposed exchange. The Justice Department stipulated in the 
antitrust action that the FCC had before it all of the evidence re-
lating to the antitrust issues, that it had a duty to, and did, consider 
whether the evidence showed any violation of the antitrust laws, 
and that it decided all issues relating to the exchange which it 
could lawfully decide. The FCC granted the exchange applications 
on December 21, 1955 without having held a hearing on the appli-
cations.7 The parties effected the exchange on January 26, 1956.8 
The Justice Department also stipulated in the antitrust suit that 
5 H. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., part I, vol. I, p. 19 (1956). 
6 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(b). 
7 Public Notice 27067 (1955), 13 PIKE AND FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 374 (1956). 
8 This was after the expiration of the 30-day period in which an appeal could have 
been taken from the approval of the commission. 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) 
§402. 
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it had been kept fully informed as to the evidence in the FCC's 
possession relating to the exchange9 and that the department had 
the right to request that the applications be set for a hearing under 
section 309(b) of the Communications Act,10 to request reconsid-
eration of the FCC decision under section 405,11 to protest the de-
cision under section 309(c),12 and to obtain judicial review of the 
decision under section 402(b).13 The department exercised none 
of these rights. 
The Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust complaint on 
December 4, 1956 under section 4 of the Sherman Act14 charging 
RCA and NBC with violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.15 
Prior to the exchange, NBC owned five VHF (very high frequency) 
television stations, the maximum allowable,16 three of which were 
in the nation's three largest markets. The complaint charged a 
conspiracy between RCA and NBC whereby NBC was to dispose 
of its two stations in the smaller markets and to acquire two sta-
tions within at least the eight largest markets; that NBC was to 
utilize its power to withhold network affiliation in order to induce 
station owners to exchange their stations; and that NBC threat-
ened to discontinue Westinghouse's NBC network affiliations in 
both Boston and Philadelphia, to refuse affiliation for a station 
Westinghouse was acquiring in Pittsburgh, and to refuse affiliation 
for any stations which Westinghouse might acquire in the fu-
ture.17 The complaint charged that thereafter NBC and Westing-
house entered into a contract providing for the · exchange subse-
quently approved. The Department of Justice requested that the 
court hold the conspiracy or combination and the exchange agree-
ment illegal, require divestiture of the Philadelphia station, re-
9 The stipulation is reprinted in appellee's brief as Appendix B. Also see H. Hear-
ings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 
2d sess., part 2, vol. 1, p. 3181 (1956). 
10 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(b). 
11 48 Stat. 1095 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §405. 
12 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(c). 
13 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §402(b). 
14 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4. 
llS 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. 
16 47 C.F.R. (1958) §3.636. 
17 It is perhaps relevant to note that Westinghouse had paid $8.5 million in 1953 
to acquire the Philadelphia station, the largest single station sale up to that time, and 
that $5 million of this figure was paid for the NBC-TV affiliation contract. H. Hearings 
before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d 
sess., part 2, vol. 1, p. 3117 (1956). 
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voke the station license, grant injunctive relief, and require ju-
dicial approval of further acquisitions by NBC of any television 
station in the eight primary markets.18 A preliminary hearing was 
held pursuant to rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure19 to determine the validity of the defendants' affirmative de-
fenses. The district court held that the affirmative defenses were 
valid and a bar to the suit, 20 stating that it lacked jurisdiction since 
the exclusive means for review of an order of the FCC is by appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under 
section 402 of the Communications Act;21 that if it had jurisdic-
tion it could not exercise it since the commission decided that the 
exchange did not violate the antitrust laws;22 and that the suit 
should be dismissed because of the equitable doctrine of laches.23 
An appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court under the Ex-
pediting Act of 1903, as amended.24 
II 
In reversing the district court on the ground that the FCC has 
no power to determine antitrust issues as such in a license pro-
ceeding and that such issues were meant to be subject to judicial 
scrutiny even after approval by the FCC, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily upon the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 which 
preceded the Communications Act of 1934. Section 313 of the 
Communications Act specifically declares the antitrust laws to be 
applicable to "interstate or foreign radio communications,"25 and 
18 Appellant's brief, p. 10. 
19 Rule 12(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
20 United States v. Radio Corporation of America and National Broadcasting Co., 
(E.D. Pa. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 333, noted and criticized in 71 HARv. L. REv. 1558 (1958); 
44 VA. L. REv. 457 (1958). 
21 158 F. Supp. 333 at 334. 
22 Id. at 335. 
23 Id. at 336. 
24 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §29. 
25 "All laws of the United States relating to unlawful restraints and monopolies and 
to combinations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade are hereby declared to 
be applicable to the manufacture and sale of and to trade in radio apparatus and devices 
entering into or affecting interstate or foreign commerce and to interstate or foreign 
radio communications, Whenever in any suit, action, or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
brought under the provisions of any of said laws or in any proceedings brought to enforce 
or to review findings and orders of the Federal Trade Commission or other governmental 
agency in respect of any matters as to which said Commission or other governmental 
agency is by law authorized to act, any licensee shall be found guilty of the violation of 
the provisions of such laws or any of them, the court, in addition to the penalties imposed 
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section 311 directs the commission to refuse a license to any per-
son "whose license has been revoked by a court under §313."26 
These provisions were taken from the Radio Act of 192727 
and seem to have originated in a prior bill in which what is now 
section 311 appeared as the third paragraph of section 2(C) and 
what is now section 313 appeared as section 2(G).28 In the hearings 
on this bill, it was stated that the Secretary of Commerce29 would 
have no discretion to refuse a license under section 2(C) to a party 
believed to be violating the antitrust laws since this was a judicial 
question and not within the discretion of the sec:retary.30 Upon 
its subsequent reintroduction, a minority report on the bill stated 
that section 2(C) might be wholly ineffective since it did not pro-
hibit or guard against "the issuance or renewal of licenses to par-
ties unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to unlawfully mo-
nopolize radio communication, etc., unless and until such party 
shall have been found guilty thereof by a Federal Court."31 This 
report proposed that a commission be established which would 
hold hearings to determine whether the applicant is violating the 
antitrust laws and, if it is so determined, that the Secretary of 
by said Jaws, may adjudge, order, and/or decree that the license of such licensee shaH, 
as of the date of the decree or judgment becomes finany effective or as of such other 
date as the said decree shaH fix, be revoked and that an rights under such license shall 
thereupon cease: Provided, however, That such licensee sha)] have the same right of 
appeal or review as is provided by Jaw in respect of other decrees and judgments of said 
court." 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313. 
26 "The Commission is directed to refuse a station license and/or the permit here• 
inafter required for the construction of a station to any person (or to any person directly 
or indirectly controHed by such person) whose license has been revoked by a court under 
section 313 of this title." 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §3ll. 
27 H. Rep. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 47, 49 (1934). 
28 H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1925). Section 2(G) was identical to the present 
§313. The third paragraph of §2(C) stated: "The Secretary of Commerce is hereby directed 
to refuse a station license and/or permit hereinafter required for the construction of a 
station to any person, firm, company, or corporation, or any subsidiary thereof, which 
has been found guilty by any Federal court of unlawfully monopolizing or attempting 
to unlawfully monopolize radio communication, directly or indirectly, ·through the control 
of the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus, through exclusive traffic arrangements, or 
by any other means. The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or any 
person aggrieved from prosecuting such person, firm, company, or corporation for a 
violation of the Jaw against unlawful restraint and monopolies and/ or combinations, 
contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade." 
20 A large part of the administration of the act, as then phrased, was to be by the 
Secretary of Commerce. 
30 H. Hearings on H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 27 (1925). 
31 H. Rep. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1926). 
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Commerce shall then refuse to grant the license.32 During the 
Senate consideration of a version of the bill, it was stated that "the 
bill does not attempt to· make the commission the judge as to 
whether or not certain conditions constitute a monopoly; it rather 
leaves that to the court."33 Congress adjourned prior to action on 
the bill but the next session reported out a version which became 
the Radio Act of 1927.34 These two sections were subsequently 
incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 as sections 311 
and 313.35 Section 311, as enacted, contained a sentence stating, 
"The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or any 
person aggrieved from proceeding against such person for violating 
the [antitrust laws]. ... "36 This sentence was repealed in 1952,37 
32 Id. at p. 23. Likewise, the House defeated an amendment which was attempted 
to be inserted when the bill reached the floor and which would •have required that a 
license .be refused to any person "found by any Federal court or the Commission to have 
been unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to unlawfully monopolize" radio com-
munication. 67 CoNG. R.Ec. 5502, 5555 (1926). 
33 67 CONG. R.Ec. 12507 (1926). 
34 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
35 H. Rep. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 47, 49 (1934). 
36 "The Commission is hereby directed to refuse a station license and/or the permit 
hereinafter required for the construction of a station to any person (or to any person 
directly or indirectly controlled by such person) whose Hcense has been revoked by a 
court under section 313, and is hereby authorized to refuse such station license and/or 
permit to any other person (or to any person directly or indirectly controlled by such 
person) which has been finally adjudged guilty by a Federal court of unlawfully monop-
olizing or attempting unlawfully to monopolize, radio communication, directly or 
indirectly, -through the control of the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus, through 
exclusive traffic arrangements, or by any other means, or 'lo have been using unfair 
methods of competition. The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or 
any person aggrieved from proceeding against such person for violating the law against 
unfair methods of competition or for a violation of ·the law against unlawful restraints 
and monopolies and/or combinations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade, or 
from instituting proceedings for the dissolution of such corporation." 48 Stat. 1086 (1934). 
This section was ,based upon §13 of the Radio Act [and §2(C) of the earlier bills] 
"modified to leave the Commission discretion in refusing licenses where the applicant has 
been adjudged by a court to be guilty of a violation of the antitrust laws but where the 
judgment !has not extended to the revocation of the existing licenses." H. Rep. 1918, 73d 
Cong., 2d sess., p. 49 (1934). 
37 66 Stat. 716 (1952). The 1952 amendment repealed both the above-mentioned 
sentence and the portion of the previous sentence giving the commission discretion to 
refuse licenses to an applicant previously adjudged by a court to ·be violating the antitrust 
laws when the court did not order such revocation. The evolution of this section has 
thus been from a mandatory refusal of a license to a person found guilty by a court of 
violating the antitrust laws (note 28 supra), to a discretionary refusal (note 36 supra), to 
a refusal only when the person's license has been revoked by a court (note 26 supra). 
The 1952 amendment would seem to indicate a congressional intent .that the FCC have 
no control over either the determination of antitrust violations or the granting of relief 
for court-determined antitrust violations. See S. Rep. 44, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1951). 
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but the Conference Committee stated, "It is the view of the mem-
bers of the conference committee that the last sentence of the pres-
ent section 311 is surplusage and that by omitting it from the 
present law the power of the United States or of any private per-
son to proceed under the antitrust laws would not be curtailed or 
affected in any way."38 Although the omitted sentence could ar-
guably have been intended to apply only to antitrust violations 
subsequent to the license grant,39 the Court appears correct in its 
view that such a restrictive interpretation would not seem natural 
in light of other legislative history.40 
Apart from the legislative history, the FCC has disavowed 
a power to determine antitrust issues as such,41 and this po-
sition had previously been approved by the Supreme Court.42 In-
deed, in approving the exchange in the principal case, the com-
mission acted under the express assumption that this approval 
would not foreclose subsequent antitrust suits by other govern-
ment agencies.43 
Commission approval of the exchange necessarily meant that 
the "public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served 
thereby."44 Antitrust issues can be considered by the commission 
in determining the public interest,45 but the determination must 
be based on the commission's own judgment on matters within its 
special competence and not merely upon a national policy favoring 
competition.46 An applicant's competitive practices, however, may 
38 H. Rep. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19 (1952). 
39 The district court opinion in the principal case, 158 F. Supp. 333 at 335. 
40 Principal case at 464. 
41 FCC Report on Chain Broadcasting 83 (1941); Report on Uniform Policy as to 
Violation .by Applicants of Laws of United States, FCC Docket No. 9572, 1 PIKE AND 
FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION, Part III, 91:495 (1950). 
42 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 at 223 (1943). 
43 13 PIKE AND FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 374 (1956). Commissioner Bartley dissented 
from the approval of the exchange. He favored a hearing since he felt that the approval 
might foreclose any effective action being taken under certain provisions of the Clayton 
Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. §18). He did not seem to fear that future action under the Sherman 
Act would be barred. Commissioner Doerfer wrote a rebuttal, Commissioner Mack con-
curring, in which he stated, at p. 382, "It is difficult to see how approval of this exchange 
may effectively preclude other governmental agencies from examining into this or any 
other transaction of the network Companies." See also H. Hearings before the Antitrust 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., part 2, vol. I, 
p. 3181 (1956). 
44 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §3IO(b). 
45 National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
46 Federal Communications Commission v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 
(1953). 
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be such as to impair the applicant's ability to serve the public and 
cause him to fall short of the public interest standard even though 
the practices do not amount to a violation of the antitrust .laws.47 
Although antitrust considerations are but one factor in determin-
ing the "public interest," it seems clear that section 3 I 3, 48 in specifi-
cally making the antitrust laws applicable to the broadcasting in-
dustry, would prohibit the commission from granting a license 
whenever the commission concluded that the license application 
was an essential part of an antitrust violation. Conversely, when-
ever the commission approves a license or exchange application, it 
would seem that the commission must necessarily have concluded, 
on the basis of the facts before it, that the application is not part 
of an antitrust violation. In accord with this view, it would appear 
that the commission found that NBC's activities were a legitimate 
use of a superior bargaining position and did not constitute an 
antitrust violation.49 The commission has exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" in 
connection with an application for a license50 or exchange51 and, 
unless reversed on appeal, this determination will be conclusive.52 
Since a commission determination that an applicant meets the 
public interest standard will be given conclusive effect, a paradox 
seems to exist. Such a determination necessarily requires that the 
commission has found the application not a part of an antitrust 
violation. Yet the principal case holds that the determination as to 
the antitrust issue will not be given conclusive effect even though 
all the facts relevant to such issue were considered by the commis-
47 Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, (D.C. Cir 1950) 
180 F. (2d) 28. 
48 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313. 
49 "In the instant case there is no scintilla of evidence that NBC conspired with 
anyone to monopolize production of network or local programs. No price fixing for 
advertisers is remotely apparent. NBC exercised its superior bargaining position to ex-
change a smaller market station (Cleveland) for a larger one (Philadelphia). 
"No suggestion is made that NBC is attempting to keep other net1vorks out of the 
Philadelphia market or any other market. Nor that it has conspired with anyone to keep 
independent broadcasters out of the markets under consideration. Even Westinghouse is 
free to re-enter ·the Philadelphia market •with another network company or as an in-
dependent, if it be so advised. No restraint of trade, or attempt to monopolize television 
services in any of the trading areas involved are discernible in this exchange transaction." 
Statement by Commissioner Doerfer, Commissioner Mack concurring, 13 Pnrn AND FISCHER, 
RADIO REGULATION 376 at 381, 382 (1956). 
50 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(a). 
5148 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §310(b). 
52 Black River Valley Broadcasts, Inc. v. McNich, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 235. 
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sion. Nevertheless, there is a satisfactory explanation for this re-
sult. The congressional intent as evidenced by legislative history 
showed a design to withhold from the FCC any power to deter-
mine antitrust issues as such and to keep within the courts the 
jurisdiction to pass on such issues. Moreover, as previously indi-
cated, the FCC has disavowed any power or desire to pass on anti-
trust issues as such and this policy had been approved by the 
Supreme Court.53 The FCC determination of the public interest 
in connection with a license application is not an adversary 
proceeding and need not involve a hearing,54 and the commis-
sion is not expressly required to notify the Justice Department 
that antitrust issues have been raised in a license or exchange 
application proceeding.55 In addition intervention and appeal 
by the Justice Department could only result in a denial of the 
application,56 requiring further antitrust relief to be sought 
elsewhere. Thus, when viewed as a practical matter, the hold-
ing in the principal case that the FCC has no power to decide 
antitrust questions seems wholly proper, any logical paradox 
notwithstanding. 
III 
Although it could not decide antitrust issues as such, the com-
mission would still be able to foreclose subsequent antitrust suits 
if the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" operated to exempt ap-
proved activities from the operation of the antitrust laws. The 
Communications Act itself seems clearly to deny the power to ex-
empt approved license exchange transactions from the applica-
bility of the antitrust laws. 57 Sections 221 and 22258 affirmatively 
authorize the FCC to approve consolidations or mergers of tele-
phone and telegraph companies and specify that the approved 
consolidations or mergers will not be subject to the antitrust laws, 
53 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 at 223 (1943). 
54 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(b). 
55 Ibid. 
56 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §402. 
57 In fact, appellees stated in their brief, at p. 20, that "they do not now contend, 
and they never have contended, that the FCC had the power to authorize the transfer 
if it violated the antitrust laws or to authorize NBC to operate the stations in violation 
of the antitrust laws." 
5848 Stat. 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §22l(a), 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. (1952) 
§222(c). 
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while section 31359 makes the antitrust laws applicable to "inter-
state or foreign radio communications." Furthermore, section 
222(c)60 requires a public hearing and notice to the Attorney Gen-
eral, among others, prior to commission approval and section 221 
(a)61 contains similar safeguards, whereas sections 309 and 31062 
require neither a hearing nor notice to the Attorney General prior 
to commission approval of an exchange application. Had Congress 
intended the approval of license or exchange applications to ex-
empt the approved transactions from the application of the anti-
trust laws it presumably would have explicitly so provided and 
would have included the procedural safeguards of sections 221 
and 222'. In deciding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to 
exempt the approved exchange, however, the Court in the princi-
pal case relied primarily upon the type of regulatory scheme pro-
vided by the Communications Act rather than upon legislative 
history or a comparison of the terms of sections 221 and 222 with 
sections 310 and 313. 63 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in the case of 
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.64 A shipper 
claimed that a carrier rate, duly filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, was unreasonable and sued in a state court to 
recover the excess. The Supreme Court held that the court action 
would not lie since the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act 
was to abolish preferences and discriminations by establishing uni-
form published rates and the power of a court to revise a published 
rate would destroy this uniformity and "render the enforcement 
of the act impossible."65 Despite the fact that the act itself provided 
that it did not "in any way abridge or alter the remedies now 
59 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313. 
60 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §222(c). 
6148 Stat. 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §22l(a). 
62 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309; 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as 
amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §310. 
63 Justice Harlan concurred in the result but not in the discussion of primary juris-
diction since :he felt that the legislative history showed that "a Commission determination 
of 'public interest, convenience, and necessity' cannot either constitute a binding adjudica-
tion upon any of the antitrust issues that may be involved in the Commission proceeding 
or serve to exempt a licensee pro tanto from the antitrust laws, and that these considera-
tions alone are dispositive of this appeal." Principal case at 468. 
64 204 U.S. 426 (1907). As to <the development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 664-673 (1951); Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The 
Anti-Trust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954). 
65 Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 at 441 (1907). 
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existing at common law or by statute,"66 the Court, although ad-
mitting that the action lay at common law, nevertheless held that 
the "act cannot be held to destroy itself."67 Professor Davis has 
said that this result was "obviously judicial legislation but the 
reasons the court gave to justify its holdings were powerful 
ones."68 Subsequent to the Abilene case it was held that while an 
attack on the tariff as unreasonable had to be decided by the com-
mission, 69 an attack on the discriminatory application of the tariff 
could be resolved by the courts as a question of law.70 In Texas and 
Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie Co.71 the Court held in a damage 
action that whether oak railroad ties were "lumber" under a tariff 
for "lumber" was a question which the ICC alone could resolve. 
In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,12 however, 
the Court limited the agency's power to interpret a tariff to the 
situation where the words of the tariff were allegedly used in a 
special sense, since the construction of a tariff presents only a 
question of law when "the words of a written instrument are used 
in their ordinary meaning."73 Agency interpretation is then not 
necessary since uniformity as to a question of law can be secured 
by action of the Supreme Court. The Court stated that the ques-
tion of reasonableness, as in Abilene, was solely for the agency. 
This was said to be true not only because of the necessary uni-
formity but also because the "determination is reached ordinarily 
upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate ap-
preciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of 
transportation is indispensable; and such acquaintance is com-
monly to be found in a body of experts."74 The Court also relied 
on the expertise factor as a justification for its distinction between 
66 24 Stat. 387 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §22. 
67 Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 at 446 (1907). 
6BDAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 665 (1951). Chief Justice Taft, in a eulogy address, 
called Chief Justice White's opinions in the Abilene case and the cases which followed 
it " •.• a conspicuous instance of his unusual and remarkable power and facility in 
statesmanlike interpretation of statute law." 257 U.S. xxv (1922). Cf. Convisser, "Primary 
Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations," 65 YALE L. J. 315 (1956). 
69 Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co., 222 U.S. 506 (1912). 
70 Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913). 
71234 U.S. 138 (1914). 
72 259 U.S. 285 (1922). 
73 Id. at 291. Cf. United States v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), note 
55 MICH. L. REv. 864 (1957). See also COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 
319 (1951). 
74 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 at 291 (1922). 
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ordinary and peculiar words.75 Thus the necessity of uniform regu-
lation and the advantages of utilizing agency expertise emerged 
as the two factors justifying the application of the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction. 7_6 
The application of primary jurisdiction in antitrust suits 
presents the additional problem of harmonizing the agency's ap-
plication of the regulatory statute with the court's application of 
the antitrust laws.77 In Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.,78 a ship-
per sued for damages alleging a conspiracy to fix rates. The Court 
dismissed the suit since the rates had been approved by the ICC 
and a recovery of damages would offend the requirement of uni-
formity. The Court held that the remedy under the antitrust 
laws had been superseded by the remedies provided under the 
Interstate Commerce Act.79 In United States Navigation Co. v. 
Cunard S.S. Co.,80 a shipping company sued to enjoin an alleged 
conspiracy violating the antitrust laws by maintaining dual rates 
not filed with and approved by the Shipping Board, but the Su-
preme Court dismissed on the ground that the Shipping Board 
had jurisdiction over the alleged practices. In Georgia v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co.,81 Georgia was allowed to maintain a bill to enjoin 
an alleged conspiracy to fix rates even though the rates had been 
approved by the ICC since the ICC did not have jurisdiction 
either to approve cooperative rate filing or to give relief against 
it.82 The Court held that an injunction, unlike a damage recov-
ery, would not interfere with the regulatory scheme. In Far East 
75 Id. at 292. See comment, 25 UNIV. Cm. L. REV. 192 (1957). 
76 Justice Frankfurter has described primary jurisdiction as " ••• a principle, now 
firmly established, that in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional ex-
perience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies 
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This 
is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence 
serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined." Far East Conference 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 574 (1952). 
77 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS 278-293 (1955); Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust 
Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 at 592-604 (1954); von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws 
and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARV. L. REV. 929 
(1954). 
78260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
79 Id. at 162. 
80 284 U.S. 474 (1932). 
81 324 U.S. 439 (1945). 
82 Id. at 455, 460. 
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Conference v. United States,83 the allegations of the government 
were almost the same as those in Cunard and the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction was applied against the government's bill84 to 
enjoin a dual rate system which had not been filed with the Mari-
time Board. 85 The Court held that if the Maritime Board refused 
to immunize the rate agreement in question, an antitrust suit 
could then be brought.86 
When the same set of facts would give rise to both a violation 
of the antitrust laws and of a regulatory statute, the availability 
of the antitrust remedy will depend upon the congressional in-
tent in fashioning remedies under the regulatory statute. If the 
agency can give adequate relief the agency remedy will then be 
held to supersede the antitrust remedy.87 Where the agency can-
not give relief against the alleged activity, primary jurisdiction 
will nevertheless apply if utilization of agency expertise is 
thought advisable or if the agency may be able to bar antitrust 
action by approving the challenged activities. The application of 
primary jurisdiction may thus require a plaintiff to prove his 
case before an agency which can not give him relief, before he 
can apply to a court for relief.88 This should result only where 
sa 342 U.S. 570 (1952). 
84 Prior to the Far East case it had been thought that primary jurisdiction would 
not be applied to bar a bill for an injunction sought by the government. See Jaffe, 
"Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 
at 595 (1954); von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine 
of Primary Jurisdiction,'' 67 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 940, 941 (1954); comment, 64 HARv. 
L. REv. 1154 (1951). 
85 The dissenting justices in the Far •East case felt that primary jurisdiction should 
not be applicable to permit retroactive exemption where the defendants failed to pursue 
the statutory procedure for securing the antitrust exemption. Far East Conference v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 578-579 (1952). See also Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., "Judicial Doctrine of 
Primary Jurisdiction as Applied in Antitrust Suits" 30, 31 (1956); comment, 58 CoL. L. 
REv. 673 at 692 (1958). But see von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated In• 
dustries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARv. L. REv. 929 at 958-960 (1954). 
86 Far "East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 577 (1952). If the Maritime 
Board does approve the rate agreement, an appeal can then be taken as to whether the 
Shipping Act authorized the approval of the questioned rates. Federal Maritime Board 
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), note 57 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1959). See also com-
ment, 58 COL. L. REv. 1069 (1958). 
87 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 at 485 (1932). 
See REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 281-282 (1955); comment, 58 COL. L. REV. 674 at 681 (1958). 
88 See Convisser, "Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalization," 65 YALE 
L. J. 315 at 335 (1956); Schwartz, "Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaus-
tion of Litigants," 41 GEO. L. J. 495 (1953); Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law: 
1942-1951,'' 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 775 at 828-831 (1953). 
898 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
initial court relief would upset a uniform rate system or where 
the utilization of agency expertise or the requirements of effec-
tive regulation clearly outweigh the disadvantages placed upon 
the plaintiff. In utilizing primary jurisdiction to harmonize the 
antitrust laws and the regulatory statute, the courts must avoid 
both an abdication of their responsibility to enforce the antitrust 
laws89 and an overzealous application of antitrust laws in areas 
where the competitive standard has been replaced by regula-
tion.90 The necessity of resort to the agency because of the re-
quirements of effective regulation will thus be largely dependent 
upon the comprehensiveness of the regulatory system in question. 
In the principal case the Court held that effective regulation 
did not require that the FCC be able to exempt the activity in 
question from the antitrust laws. Primary jurisdiction was not 
justified since there were no rate structures which could be up-
set by the antitrust suit and, rather than being comprehensively 
regulated, the field of broadcasting is one of free competition.91 
Prior to the principal case it had been thought that dictum in 
Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Broadcasting 
Co.92 might authorize the FCC to exempt challenged transactions' 
previously approved by the commission.93 This decision by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed an order deny-
ing a motion for a preliminary injunction and was based on the 
principle that such orders are discretionary. The court said that 
there was a lack of persuasive evidence of a violation and men-
tioned that the commission had "sanctioned" many of the terms 
of the affiliation contracts in question.94 It appears, however, that 
the court was not implying that the commission could exempt 
89 See Schwartz, "Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An 
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility," 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954); Jaffe, "Primary 
Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 at 603 (1954). 
90 Von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of 
Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARV. L. REV. 929 at 953-958 (1954). 
91 FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
92 (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 349, cert. den. 335 U.S. 821 (1948). 
93 See H. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., part 2, vol. I, pp. 3111-3112 (1956); Staff Report to 
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 
"Judicial Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction as Applied in Antitrust Suits" 28 (1956); com-
ment, 44 VA. L. REV. 1131 (1958). 
94 Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 
167 F. (2d) 349 at 352, cert. den. 335 U.S. 821 (1948). 
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such contracts from the impact of the antitrust laws but looked 
upon the commission approval merely as further evidence to 
justify denial of the temporary injunction. 
IV 
The decision in the principal case declares for the first time 
that FCC approval under its "public interest" standard will not 
exempt approved transactions from subsequent attack under the 
antitrust laws even though the commission has considered all evi-
dence bearing on the antitrust question and necessarily con-
cluded that there was no antitrust violation. The Court also re-
fused to expand the possibility of antitrust exemptions under the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction beyond cases involving rate 
structures or industries subject to comprehensive regulation. It 
is likely that the impact of the principal case will not be limited 
to the television industry. Although the natural gas industry is 
more extensively regulated, this case may directly affect pipeline 
construction and operation which is subject to the approval of 
the Federal Power Commission.95 
The decision of the Court seems eminently proper.96 It is true 
that much inconvenience is caused to the parties by suit being 
brought almost a year after consummation of a transaction in-
volving millions of dollars and vast changes in facilities and per-
sonnel. But as the Court pointed out, 97 any business judgment as 
to the desirability of a contemplated transaction must take into 
account possible infringement of the antitrust laws. The deci-
sion made by the parties in the principal case differed from de-
cisions made by completely unregulated concerns only in that 
they had to obtain the approval of the commission. No coercion 
by the commission was involved. Even after approval, they could 
complete the exchange or not, solely upon the basis of sound 
business judgment. Since the scope of the agency approval is lim-
ited to the "public interest, convenience, and necessity," any 
reliance upon such approval as a shield against subsequent anti-
95 See 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717f(c). 
96 The Court also pointed out .that the other contentions of ,the appellees fell of 
their own weight. There could be no estoppel or !aches since ·the antitrust issue was not 
before the commission, and the government did not ihave a duty to intervene in the FCC 
proceedings or to seek review of the license grant. Principal case at 468. 
97 Principal case at 467. 
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trust suits is clearly misplaced.98 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
after a careful consideration of all the evidence, the commission 
found no antitrust violation. Although such a determination has 
now been held not binding, it should be given substantial evi-
dentiary weight in a subsequent judicial determination of anti-
trust issues. 
John F. Powell, S.Ed. 
98 In fairness to RCA and NBC, the failure of the Justice Department to intervene 
when FCC approval was sought provided the parties with at least some basis for acting 
in reliance on the commission's order without •fear of committing an illegal act. The 
principal case now warns that such reliance is unfounded. 
